#### **CURRENT POLITICAL PHENOMENA (30481)**

# **Going Negative in Political Campaigns**

#### Tommaso Nannicini (Bocconi University)

## Persuasive communication

Persuasion is a key to success in business, personal career, fund-raising, and... politics

Persuasive communication matters not only for its factual content, but also for its tone/attitude

Key decision in competitive persuasion (DellaVigna & Gentzkow 2010) is whether to run aggressive campaign against rivals or focus on self-promotion

✓ Negative vs positive campaigning in politics

## Negative campaigning

First example of negative electoral ad in US Presidential campaign: 1964 "Daisy Spot" aired (only once) by Lyndon B. Johnson against Barry Goldwater

Since then, negative campaigning has enormously increased (maybe reaching a new peak in 2016 election)

Conventional wisdom among practitioners: Negative ads capture voters attention  $\rightarrow$  It pays to go negative

But is it just instinctive (and short-lived) reaction? Or do voters extract information (and update their beliefs) based on the tone of the campaign? How?

## Empirical studies on going negative

Do negative electoral ads increase turnout and/or affect swing voters (vs positive electoral ads)?

Ansolabehere et al. (1994): 2 survey experiments in 3 electoral races in California  $\rightarrow$  (One) negative ad reduces voting intentions by 5 percent

Arceneaux and Nickerson (2010): 2 field experiments (canvassing) in Minnesota & Los Angeles  $\rightarrow$  No effect

Studies using observational or survey data and content analysis  $\rightarrow$  No (de-mobilizing) effect

See references at the end of the slides

# How to classify empirical studies / 1

#### **Econometric strategies**:

- Survey data (multivariate correlations)
- Survey experiments
- Survey experiments in the field
- Field experiments (partisan vs nonpartisan)

#### **Treatment tools:**

- Flyer/hanger
- Mailer
- Phone call
- Video ad
- Canvassing

# How to classify empirical studies / 2

#### **Timing:**

- Independent of real campaign
- Before real campaign
- Right before real campaign

#### **Outcomes**:

- Self-declared (instantaneous) reaction
- Self-declared voting intention
- Self-declared retrospective vote
- Observed vote
- Beliefs

# How to classify empirical studies / 3

#### **Potential effects:**

- No effect
- Positive/negative effect on receiver of the attack
- Positive/negative effect on the sender of the attack
- Positive/negative effect on third parties
- No average treatment effect, but heterogeneous effects

# Galasso and Nannicini (2017)

We study the *differential response of male and female voters* to negative vs positive campaigning in Italy

#### **Study 1: Survey experiment (in the field)**

In the 2011 municipal election in Milan, we randomized negative vs positive (vs no) campaign by the main (male) opponent using 4 different campaigning tools

#### **Study 2: Event study**

In the same election, we use sudden attack by (female) incumbent against (male) opponent during a TV show

# Galasso and Nannicini (2017), cont'd

#### **Study 3: Field experiment (canvassing RCT)**

In the 2015 municipal election in Cava de' Tirreni, we randomized negative vs. positive (vs. no) campaign by one of the (male) opponents

## <u>Study 1</u>: Survey experiment

- Field context: 2011 municipal election in Milan
- **Treatment**: Positive vs negative electoral campaign by the opponent (same campaign by the incumbent)
- Electoral campaign tools: We randomize (i) video interview with the candidate; (ii) campaign slogan; (iii) open letter; (iv) video ad endorsed by candidate
- Online sample of actual eligible voters, from 1,536 individuals in 1<sup>st</sup> survey to 1,140 in the 4<sup>th</sup>
- Four surveys: (1) pre-treatment information; (2) 1<sup>st</sup> wave of political ads; (3) 2<sup>nd</sup> wave of political ads;
  (4) post-treatment electoral survey

## Experiment setup



Survey IV May 16/ May 23







Run-off Elections (May 29-30) Pisapia becomes Major of Milano with 55 % of the votes

## Informational treatments

Individuals in the treatment groups watch 4 electoral campaign items, in a positive vs negative tone by the opponent, and same (real-world) tone by the incumbent

- Item 1 100-second video interview (2<sup>nd</sup> survey)
- Item 2 Campaign slogan (2<sup>nd</sup> survey)
- Item 3 Letter to voters (3<sup>rd</sup> survey)
- Item 4 60-second endorsed video ad (3<sup>rd</sup> survey)

For each electoral campaign item by the opponent, same issues, same format, and same setting (available online)

### Positive campaign slogan



## Negative campaign slogan



# **Empirical strategy**

$$\begin{split} Y_i = \alpha_1 \textit{POS}_i + \alpha_2 \textit{NEG}_i + \beta_1 \textit{POS}_i \times \textit{FEMALE}_i + \beta_2 \textit{NEG}_i \times \textit{FEMALE}_i + \\ + \delta \textit{FEMALE}_i + \varepsilon_i \end{split}$$

- (H1) Treatment effect of positive vs. no campaign for females:  $\alpha 1+\beta 1=0$
- (H2) Treatment effect of negative vs. no campaign for females:  $\alpha 2+\beta 2=0$
- (H3) Treatment effect of positive vs. negative campaign for males:  $\alpha 1 \alpha 2 = 0$
- (H4) Treatment effect of positive vs. negative campaign for females:  $(\alpha 1 + \beta 1) - (\alpha 2 + \beta 2) = 0$
- (H5) Differential treatment effect of positive vs. negative campaign between males and females:  $\beta 1 \beta 2 = 0$
- (H6) Treatment effect of any campaign vs. no campaign for males:  $\alpha 1 + \alpha 2 = 0$
- (H7) Treatment effect of any campaign vs. no campaign for females:  $(\alpha 1+\beta 1)+(\alpha 2+\beta 2)=0$
- (H8) Differential treatment effect of any campaign vs. no campaign between males and females:  $\beta 1 + \beta 2 = 0$

# Validity checklist

- ✓ Covariate balance tests
- ✓ Covariate balance tests with gender interaction
- ✓ Covariate balance tests by gender strata
- ✓ Include attrition rate among covariates
- ✓ Same beliefs for males/females → Incumbent's campaign perceived as more negative in the treatment group associated with negative messages

✓ Full HP testing in the paper

## Positive vs negative, 2<sup>nd</sup> survey



## Positive vs negative, 3<sup>rd</sup> survey



## Positive vs negative, first round



### Positive vs negative, runoff



# Overall empirical results, first round

	Turnout	Opponent's	Incumbent's	Others'
	rate	vote share	vote share	vote share
Positive campaign $(\alpha_1)$	0.031	-0.110*	$0.127^{**}$	-0.018
	[0.043]	[0.059]	[0.054]	[0.063]
Negative campaign $(\alpha_2)$	$0.082^{**}$	-0.075	0.100	-0.025
	[0.037]	[0.069]	[0.061]	[0.054]
Positive campaign $\times$ Female ( $\beta_1$ )	-0.080	0.190**	-0.207***	0.018
	[0.051]	[0.080]	[0.075]	[0.070]
Negative campaign $\times$ Female ( $\beta_2$ )	-0.114**	0.065	-0.101	0.036
	[0.049]	[0.083]	[0.077]	[0.065]
Female	0.061	0.004	0.067	-0.071
	[0.040]	[0.071]	[0.057]	[0.052]
<i>P-value H1:</i> $\alpha_1 + \beta_1 = 0$	0.068*	0.154	0.119	0.994
<i>P-value H2:</i> $\alpha_2 + \beta_2 = 0$	0.289	0.851	0.982	0.770
P-value H3: $\alpha_1 - \alpha_2 = 0$	0.092*	0.435	0.619	0.876
<i>P-value H4:</i> $\alpha_1 + \beta_1 - (\alpha_2 + \beta_2) = 0$	0.556	0.062*	$0.074^{*}$	0.776
<i>P-value H5:</i> $\beta_1 - \beta_2 = 0$	0.365	$0.035^{**}$	0.076*	0.785
<i>P-value H6:</i> $\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 0$	0.137	0.132	$0.033^{**}$	0.694
P-value H7: $\alpha_1 + \beta_1 + \alpha_2 + \beta_2 = 0$	0.102	0.460	0.342	0.870
<i>P-value H8:</i> $\beta_1 + \beta_2 = 0$	$0.043^{**}$	0.104	$0.034^{**}$	0.656
Obs.	1,140	912	912	912

# Channels

- To analyze potential channels, which may drive gender differences, we add interaction terms with:
  - Age
  - College education
  - Left-wing political orientation
  - Low interest in politics
- Introduction of these additional explanatory variables (and of respective interaction terms) does not eliminate gender effect
- But what about gender identification with the candidate?

# Study 2: Event study



- Moratti ran largely negative campaign (according to 75% of control group) while Pisapia largely positive
- On May 11<sup>th</sup> during **SKY TV debate**, Moratti accused Pisapia of links to terrorists in his youth
- We exploit answers to 3<sup>rd</sup> survey (which was running) plus Twitter data (content analysis with 54 positive vs 54 negative stems) 23

### Negative vs positive, Sky TV



### Negative vs positive, Twitter



# Study 3: Field experiment

- Field experiment in 2015 in Cava de' Tirreni
- **Cava**: Town with 46k voters and 55 electoral precincts, 40km south of Naples. May 31<sup>st</sup> 2015
- **Background**: Center-right incumbent, two main opponents from center-left and civic list; all males
- Canvassing done by 20 volunteers (aged 18-25) from May 10<sup>th</sup> to May 29<sup>th</sup>
- Negative campaigning in 18 precincts (around 15,500 voters), positive campaigning in 18 precincts, 19 precincts in the control group

## Canvassing map



## Canvassing by volunteers



# Experimental design

- **Canvassing**: (i) flyers in all treated precincts; (ii) buzz intercom for personal communication; (iii) speech at their home by canvassers, if allowed in
- **Treatment**: Positive vs negative electoral messages by civic-list opponent
  - We *bargained* the text with the candidate as this was big part of his true campaign
  - But we didn't tell him the location of treatment groups
- **Campaign tools** that we randomized: (i) flyers; (ii) hangers; (iii) message by the canvassers
- Two phone surveys before and after the election: Sample of around 1,100 eligible voters in 1<sup>st</sup> survey; 857 in the 2<sup>nd</sup>

# **Campaign flyers**

#### **CAVA CI APPARTIENE**

#### **METTIAMOCI IN GIOCO**



Nei prossimi 5 anni con Lamberti: ✓ PIÙ ASCOLTO E DIALOGO COI CITTADINI ✓ PIÙ COMPETENZA E TRASPARENZA ✓ PIÙ SERVIZI OSPEDALIERI E TERRITORIALI

#### **CAVA CI APPARTIENE**

#### **RIPRENDIAMOCELA INSIEME**



Negli ultimi 5 anni con Galdi:

✓ TROPPA VECCHIA POLITICA
 ✓ TROPPI SPRECHI E TROPPE TASSE COMUNALI
 ✓ TROPPI DEBITI SULLE SPALLE DEI CITTADINI

#### LAMBERTI

#### SINDACO

LAMBERTI

#### SINDACO

### Volunteers in action



# **Empirical strategy**

$$\begin{split} Y_i = \alpha_1 \textit{POS}_i + \alpha_2 \textit{NEG}_i + \beta_1 \textit{POS}_i \times \textit{FEMALE}_i + \beta_2 \textit{NEG}_i \times \textit{FEMALE}_i + \\ + \delta \textit{FEMALE}_i + \varepsilon_i \end{split}$$

- (H1) Treatment effect of positive vs. no campaign for females:  $\alpha 1+\beta 1=0$
- (H2) Treatment effect of negative vs. no campaign for females:  $\alpha 2+\beta 2=0$
- (H3) Treatment effect of positive vs. negative campaign for males:  $\alpha 1 \alpha 2 = 0$
- (H4) Treatment effect of positive vs. negative campaign for females:  $(\alpha 1 + \beta 1) - (\alpha 2 + \beta 2) = 0$
- (H5) Differential treatment effect of positive vs. negative campaign between males and females:  $\beta 1 \beta 2 = 0$
- (H6) Treatment effect of any campaign vs. no campaign for males:  $\alpha 1 + \alpha 2 = 0$
- (H7) Treatment effect of any campaign vs. no campaign for females:  $(\alpha 1+\beta 1)+(\alpha 2+\beta 2)=0$
- (H8) Differential treatment effect of any campaign vs. no campaign between males and females:  $\beta 1 + \beta 2 = 0$

# Validity checklist

- $\checkmark$  Covariate balance tests at the polling place level
- ✓ Covariate balance tests at the individual (survey) level
- $\checkmark$  Covariate balance tests with gender interaction
- $\checkmark$  Covariate balance tests by gender strata
- ✓ Include attrition rate among covariates
- ✓ Incumbent's campaign perceived as more negative in the treatment group associated with negative messages <u>and</u> no treatment effects on beliefs about valence and ideology of main candidates

## Positive vs negative, full sample



## Positive vs negative, canvassed sample



# Overall empirical results, canvassed

	Turnout	Opponent's	Incumbent's	Others'
	rate	vote share	vote share	vote share
Positive campaign $(\alpha_1)$	0.041	-0.031	-0.144	0.166
	[0.074]	[0.031]	[0.117]	[0.123]
Negative campaign $(\alpha_2)$	0.045	$0.154^{*}$	-0.270***	0.110
	[0.070]	[0.082]	[0.099]	[0.125]
Positive campaign × Female $(\beta_1)$	-0.063	0.159**	-0.036	-0.122
	[0.087]	[0.075]	[0.138]	[0.153]
Negative campaign × Female ( $\beta_2$ )	-0.059	-0.099	0.132	0.036
	[0.083]	[0.100]	[0.125]	[0.152]
Female	0.060	0.050	-0.001	-0.080
	[0.053]	[0.041]	[0.096]	[0.100]
$P-value H1: \alpha_1 + \beta_1 = 0$	0.628	0.060*	0.014**	0.622
<i>P-value H2:</i> $\alpha_2 + \beta_2 = 0$	0.757	0.345	$0.073^{*}$	$0.094^{*}$
<i>P-value H3:</i> $\alpha_1 - \alpha_2 = 0$	0.956	$0.015^{**}$	0.189	0.649
<i>P-value H4:</i> $\alpha_1 + \beta_1 - (\alpha_2 + \beta_2) = 0$	0.875	0.372	0.618	0.338
P-value H5: $\beta_1 - \beta_2 = 0$	0.963	0.021 * *	0.188	0.334
<i>P-value H6:</i> $\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 0$	0.480	0.211	$0.035^{**}$	0.199
P-value H7: $\alpha_1 + \beta_1 + \alpha_2 + \beta_2 = 0$	0.615	0.059*	0.011**	1.183
<i>P-value H8:</i> $\beta_1 + \beta_2 = 0$	0.389	0.659	0.677	0.739
Obs.	560	282	282	282

# Channels

- To analyze potential channels, which may drive gender differences, we add interaction terms with:
  - Age
  - College education
  - Left-wing political orientation
  - Competition vs cooperation
- Introduction of these additional explanatory variables (and of respective interaction terms) does not eliminate gender effect
- But competition/cooperation measured in very direct and naïve way

# What do we get from these 3 studies?

- Positive vs negative affects male/female voters differently
  - Going negative pays off with males but backfires with females
  - And these patterns are not explained by gender differences in observable characteristics
- Results robust to gender combination of sender/receiver:
  - Male against female candidate (Milan survey experiment)
  - Female against male candidate (Milan event study)
  - Male against male candidate (Cava field experiment)
- Similar results in 3 identification frameworks
- Similar results with different campaign tools

# Galasso, Nannicini, and Nunnari (work in progress)

- Positive spillovers from negative campaigning
- Setting: field experiment (Canvassing in Cava)
- Outcomes: true vote shares at precinct level + self-declared individual votes in the post-election survey
- Effects: negative campaign harms both the sender of the attack and the receiver (incumbent mayor), favoring a third candidate (the main challenger)
- Potential channels: strategic voting vs beliefs updating (backfiring of negative campaign)
- To disentangle between the two...

# Welcome to Castel Gufo

- (Fake) Castel Gufo
  - It's a quite, medium size city located in the center of Italy
  - Its local economy is based on tourism and small business
- Local elections are about to take place in Castel Gufo
  - With a first-past-the-post electoral system
  - Between the (male) incumbent and a (male) opponent
  - We expect a tight race
- During the incumbent's term in office, no major event took place. The hottest local debate is about the city center being closed to local traffic to benefit tourism

## Meet the candidates



#### The incumbent

#### The opponent





## Negative



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